



CONGRESS

and HARRY S. TRUMAN
A CONFLICTED LEGACY



Edited by
Donald A. Ritchie

Congress and Harry S. Truman: A Conflicted Legacy
The Truman Legacy Series, Volume 7

Based on the Seventh Truman Legacy Symposium
Truman and Congress: A Conflicted Legacy
May 2009
Key West, Florida

Edited by
Donald A. Ritchie

CONGRESS

and HARRY S. TRUMAN
A CONFLICTED LEGACY

Edited by
Donald A. Ritchie



Volume 7

Truman State University Press

Copyright © 2011 Truman State University Press, Kirksville, Missouri 63501
All rights reserved
tsup.truman.edu

Cover photo: President Truman appearing before a joint session of Congress, April 16, 1945. (US Senate Historical Office)

Cover design: Katie Best

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Truman Legacy Symposium (7th : 2009 : Key West, Fla.)
Congress and Harry S. Truman : a conflicted legacy / edited by Donald A. Ritchie.
p. cm. — (Truman legacy series ; v. 7)
“Based on the seventh Truman Legacy Symposium, Truman and Congress : a conflicted legacy, May, 2009, Key West, Florida”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-935503-94-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-935503-96-5 (e-book)
1. Truman, Harry S., 1884–1972—Congresses. 2. United States—Politics and government—1945–1953—Congresses. I. Ritchie, Donald A., 1945– II. Title.
E813.T718 2009
973.918092—dc22

2011015105

No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any format by any means without written permission from the publisher.

The paper in this publication meets or exceeds the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1992.

CONTENTS

SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE. ix
Michael J. Devine

FOREWORD. xiii
Senator George S. McGovern

INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTS WORKING WITH
CONGRESS, FROM TRUMAN TO OBAMA. xvii
Donald A. Ritchie

SECTION I: CONGRESS IN THE TRUMAN ERA

WHAT PRESIDENT TRUMAN THOUGHT OF CONGRESS
AND HOW HE CHOSE TO DEAL WITH IT 3
Ken Hechler

CONGRESS AND TRUMAN: A CLASH OF PARTIES
AND PERSONALITIES. 15
Raymond W. Smock

TRIUMPHS, TRIBULATIONS, AND TURNIP DAY
SESSIONS IN THE 80TH CONGRESS: HARRY TRUMAN
COPE WITH DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 21
Richard S. Conley

GRAPHIC ESSAY 53
Raymond H. Geselbracht

SECTION 2: DOMESTIC POLICY

HARRY S. TRUMAN AND CONGRESS: PRESIDENTIAL
EFFECTIVENESS AND THE LIBERAL SCORECARD 85
Alonzo L. Hamby

TRUMAN THE BIPARTISAN? REASSESSING THE RECORD
OF THE “DO-NOTHING” CONGRESS 101

Robert P. Watson

TRUMAN, ANTICOMMUNISM, AND CONGRESS. 124

Robert David Johnson

SECTION 3: FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY

WINNING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR A NEW APPROACH
TO THE WORLD: TRUMAN, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE
EIGHTIETH CONGRESS 143

Susan M. Hartmann

TRUMAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 156

Louis Fisher

TRUMAN, CONGRESS, AND THE MILITARY 180

Burton I. Kaufman

CONTRIBUTORS 199

INDEX. 203

ILLUSTRATIONS & TABLES

TRIUMPHS, TRIBULATIONS, AND TURNIP DAY SESSIONS IN THE 80TH CONGRESS

Figure 1: Comparative Success Rate, House of Representatives	31
Figure 2: Comparative Success Rate, Senate	32
Table 1: Truman’s Position Vote Success Rate, 80th Congress	28
Table 2: Regression Analysis of Presidential Support Scores in the House of Representatives, 80th Congress	34
Table 3: Regression Analysis of Presidential Support Scores in the Senate, 80th Congress	34
Table 4: Democrats in the 80th Senate with Expected Support Scores $\leq 10\%$	37
Table 5: Democrats in the 80th Senate with Expected Support Scores $\geq 10\%$	39
Table 6: Position Votes in the House of Representatives, 80th Congress	46
Table 7: Position Votes of Senate, 80th Congress	48

GRAPHIC ESSAY

Images courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, unless specified.

Harry Truman to Bess Wallace, n.d. [postmarked May 28, 1917] (excerpt)	53
President Harry S. Truman	54
Matthew J. Connelly, ca. 1945.	55
President Truman and members of the White House staff, Key West, Florida, March 13, 1951	56
Charles Maylon to President Truman, April 26, 1951	57
President Truman meeting with the “Big Four,” January 14, 1952	58
Charles F. Murphy and Stephen J. Spingarn to the President, September 12 [<i>sic</i> , perhaps September 1 or 2], 1950.	59

President Truman delivering the State of the Union Address,
 January 4, 1950 60

Draft of President Truman’s radio address on his veto of the
 Taft-Hartley Act, September 20, 1947 62

Truman personal writing, not dated (probably ca. March 21, 1947) . . . 64

Charles S. Murphy, Memorandum for the President, February
 17, 1949 66

Truman Diary, November 1, 1949 (excerpt) 67

Truman Personal Writing, November 30, 1950 68

Memorandum, Sam Rayburn to Harry S. Truman, November
 10, 1946 70

President Truman offering farewell wishes, Washington National
 Airport, August 13, 1947 72

President Truman giving a press conference, Key West, Florida,
 March 30, 1950 73

Senators William E. Jenner, Robert A. Taft and Homer E. Capehart
 talking prior to a Republican caucus, January 1, 1952 74

President Truman signs H.R. 4590, July 31, 1946 76

Draft memorandum by George M. Elsey, n.d., ca. June 27, 1950 78

“The ‘Fair Deal’: A Legislative Scorecard,” graphic 81

TRUMAN THE BIPARTISAN?

Table 1: Comparison of Federal Judicial Appointments
 Confirmed by the Senate 104

Table 2: Comparison of Presidential Vetoes 105

Table 3: Comparison of “Significant Bills” (Public) Vetoed 105

Table 4: Outcome of Major Presidential Vetoes 106

Table 5: Outcome of Presidential Vetoes of Significant Bills 106

Table 6. Presidential Rationale Behind Vetoes 114

SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

This volume is the seventh in the Truman Legacy Series published by Truman State University Press. Prior volumes have focused on President Truman's policies relating to foreign affairs, civil rights, Israel, Native Americans, the environment, and immigration. The subject here, and at a May 2009 conference in Key West, Florida, where most of these essays were presented, is the legacy Truman left with respect to relations between the president and Congress.

President Truman has left an extraordinary legacy in many areas of public policy. His presidency occurred at a time of exceptional change in the United States and throughout the world, and Truman had to respond to all the challenges these changes presented. During my time as director of the Harry S. Truman Library, I have often felt that Truman's presidency seems to be the first presidency of the modern world, and that the beginnings of all that was to come for the next half century were squeezed into his eight short years. Of course the Truman presidency is my job and perhaps I am biased. But historians, political scientists, and others have agreed on the great importance of the Truman years and have produced an immense literature about his presidency.

Inevitably, though, this literature is uneven and incomplete, and many aspects of Truman's legacy are imperfectly understood. Some areas, such as civil rights, are well understood but are in the midst of reexamination, while other areas, such as environmental policy, have never received much attention. The area explored in this volume appears to be suffering from too much more-or-less-unexplored conventional wisdom.

President Truman advocated an incredibly ambitious set of domestic policies, and Congress failed to pass very many of them into law. As a result, Truman is often judged to have had poor relations with Congress. The authors whose essays are collected in the present volume, however, put forward collectively a view of Truman's relations with Congress—and Congress's relations with Truman—that transcends such a simplistic judgment. On the one hand, Truman established a good record of dealing with the problem of divided government during the 80th Congress, especially in the area of foreign affairs; however, he failed to deal effectively with

the anti-Communist hysteria that infected Congress during much of his administration. His record in dealing with a Congress newly reformed to make it an effect counter to the increasingly powerful executive branch was solid, given the circumstances. But he made a serious error in going to war in Korea without receiving authorization from Congress. In pairing pluses and minuses, one could also say that Congress was so often wrong-headed during Truman's presidency that bad relations between the White House and Congress were exactly the right thing. Or one could conclude that, given the difficult situation Truman inherited from President Roosevelt vis-à-vis Congress, it was a significant accomplishment to establish, through domestic policy proposals that Congress rejected, an agenda for the next generation of American liberals. All these views are present in the following pages.

I am very grateful that Ken Hechler is again represented among the authors of a Truman Legacy Series volume. Ken is one of the most remarkable people I know. He is important to me in my daily life at the Truman Library because he worked on President Truman's White House Staff from 1949 to 1953. The first two sentences of his essay in this volume show how he feels about his former boss in the White House: "Abraham Lincoln saved the Union. Harry Truman saved the world!" His White House service alone would have made him a great man to me, but in addition to this he is a bestselling author (*The Bridge at Remagen*, 1957) and served as a member of Congress for eighteen years and as secretary of state for West Virginia for sixteen years. Throughout his adult life he has served as an inspirational professor of political science and history. He is a lifelong idealist who recently was a prominent member of a protest against mining practices in his home state of West Virginia. I am leaving out other extraordinary things about Ken's life, inevitably since a lengthy book would be needed to mention everything I should say about him.

Congress and Harry S. Truman: A Conflicted Legacy, and the conference that gave rise to it, required the good work of many people. Don Ritchie served as program chair for the conference and edited the book; without him, neither would have been possible. Nancy Rediger and Barbara Smith-Mandell at Truman State University Press skillfully transformed a manuscript into an attractive book. Many people in Key West provided essential support, financial and otherwise: Ed Swift, president of the Harry S. Truman Little White House Foundation and of Historical Tours of America; Chris Belland, Piper Smith-Belland, and Monica Munoz of Historical Tours of America; the Spottswood Companies, Inc., which provided lodging for conference presenters and a beautiful venue for conference sessions; Sheila Jaskot and Delia Rios of C-SPAN, who

enabled the conference presenters to make their arguments to a large audience of viewers throughout the country; and the Monroe County Tourist Development Council, which provided support for promoting the conference in South Florida.

I have saved until last, because they are so important to the Truman Legacy conferences and also great friends and colleagues, Bob Wolz and Paul Hilson of the Truman Little White House, and Ray Geselbracht of the Truman Library.

Michael J. Devine
Director, Harry S. Truman Library

FOREWORD

Senator George S. McGovern

President Truman went to Key West often during his eight years in office, spending there a total of one hundred and seventy-five days—just four days short of half of a presidential year. But I happen to know that he always kept in the closest touch with what was going on back in Washington, and he meant it when he said, “The buck stops here, at my desk,” and it did.

Truman was somewhat like President Washington, who much preferred his home in Mount Vernon for executive office. And like Thomas Jefferson, who much preferred his home in Monticello, President Truman was more at home in Key West than he was in the White House. It’s interesting that all three of these men, Washington, Jefferson, and Truman, were assailed nonstop during the years they were president. Take Jefferson, for example. He was accused of everything from being a pawn in the hands of the French to being an atheist, and his opponents said that if he was elected president, Bibles would be confiscated all over America. One Federalist author got so carried away that he said that if Jefferson were elected against the Federalist candidate, John Adams, that there would be French armies marching in the streets of Washington. Well, John Adams was a conservative Federalist but he had great good sense. Even though that blast against Jefferson was supposed to benefit Adams’ campaign for the presidency, he said, “I no more expect to see a French army in America than I do in heaven.”

All these men had good sense in common. Certainly Truman was assailed, in spite of what I think was a very remarkable record. When he left the White House after eight years, his public approval in this country had sunk to only 22 percent. I think that’s an outrage. Truman was the president who led the way on civil rights, even before people like Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy were involved. He gave us the Marshall Plan, one of the most farsighted measures of reconstruction after a devastating

war. He did so many things, and yet at the end of all that service, only 22 percent of the American people said that they had confidence in his leadership. It's little wonder that even George Washington, the father of our country, when asked to try for a third term, said he would rather be in his grave than spend another four years in the presidency. For these men who had done so much for us, sometimes the presidency was a pillory.

I knew President Truman up close on three different occasions. First, when I was running for Congress the first time, as a Democrat in Republican South Dakota. If you think Florida is tough for a Democrat, try South Dakota. There is no way I could have been elected without at least a third of the Republicans in my state voting for me, so I'm not mad at Republicans, at least the ones who voted for me. If I had gotten 100 percent of the Democratic vote in my state, which I usually did, I still would have been overwhelmingly defeated without the support of a strong group of independents and Republicans. But I was in what seemed like trouble in that first race when my opponent started running full-page ads. I didn't even have the money to think about matching that, but he was running a series of ads somehow implying that I wasn't interested in the security of the country. I had advocated in 1956 that we recognize the government of China, which had been in power since 1949. It wasn't that I approved of communism, but I thought the more dangerous a country is, the more important it is we have an embassy there to keep track of what's going on.

Interestingly enough, one of the political figures who used to wave the Communist flag against candidates he opposed was Richard Nixon, and historians now agree that Nixon's greatest achievement was opening relations with Communist China. But when I advocated that in 1956, these big ads started appearing: "Do you want George McGovern in the Congress, a Friend of Communism in China?" and so on. So I called President Truman and said, "Mr. President, I know you're awfully busy raising funds for your library and other things. I hate to ask you this, but I'm in a very tough race as the first Democrat who has a chance of being elected in this state in over a quarter of a century. Could you come out and make an appearance with me?" To my surprise, he said, "I'll be out there." He showed up and we sat on the back of a convertible in a parade through the heart of Sioux Falls, the biggest city in South Dakota. I told him what the problem was. I said, "What would you do if you were me and your opponent was running these full-page ads suggesting you must be soft on communism?" He said, "George, just kick him in the ass with the facts."

Anyway, I was riding with President Truman on the back seat of a convertible and a young man yelled at us as we came around the corner. He said, "President Truman, Alben Barkley just died." The news had just broken

and this newsboy had the story. Truman just slumped, and I remember the anguish on his face. He broke into tears; he was terribly upset about it. I was sorry that had to happen when he was in my state.

Well, I won that election and four years later I boldly decided to run for US Senate against Karl Mundt, who had been in the Senate longer than anybody from either party in the history of South Dakota. I decided I was ready to take him on. I was in Washington at the Mayflower Hotel with our state chairman, and he said, "George, Harry Truman is up on the seventh floor. Why don't I call up there and see if we can go up there and talk to him? Maybe he'll come out and help you in South Dakota." So we gave him a call and his secretary came on the phone and said, "Well, I talked to President Truman and I think that he is going to see you tomorrow morning. I'm going to put him on the phone." President Truman came on the phone, and I said, "Mr. President, I've got a big favor to ask you." He replied, "I know what you're calling about. You want me to come out to South Dakota and knock out old Senator Karl Mundt, and I'll be glad to do it."

He came out again in 1960, but we didn't win. Jack Kennedy was the Democratic nominee and people were scared to death out in South Dakota about a Catholic in the White House. I wasn't afraid, but enough of my fellow South Dakotans were. While Kennedy lost the state heavily in Democratic precincts, I came within a half of one percent of defeating Karl Mundt, and I think President Truman had something to do with that.

President Truman died in 1972, the year I ran for president. The last time I saw him was in 1965, and he was then still raising money for his library. He wanted to come to South Dakota and he got a South Dakotan by the name of Joe Robby to head the library campaign. Joe Robby was the owner of the Miami Dolphins and the first owner to build a stadium with funds he raised himself, no government money at all in that stadium. I keep all those experiences with me to this day.

But I could add one comment that's a little more critical: When President Truman tried to get aid for Turkey and Greece, he was told they were threatened by Communist takeover. The British had pulled out of the Mediterranean and, in effect, said, "It is up to you Americans now to take care of security in that area." Truman was seriously considering a \$400 million grant to Greece and Turkey. He called on Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, a man better known for his pomposity than his wisdom. Vandenberg told Truman that if he wanted to get this through Congress, he would have to scare the hell out of the American people. He would have to build up this Communist threat as though it were a mortal danger to the American people. President Truman, in effect, did that, and got the \$400 million. The only problem with that is when you have a leader

INTRODUCTION

Presidents Working with Congress, from Truman to Obama

Donald A. Ritchie

The Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) conducted a survey on presidential leadership in 2009 that ranked Harry Truman fifth among all presidents, ahead of every one of his successors in the White House. The network contacted a cross section of the historians, political scientists, and journalists who had written on American political history and appeared on its programs. To counter the subjective and sometimes capricious nature of such polls, C-SPAN asked these judges to rate the presidents in ten categories as a way of determining which qualities set them apart. Truman scored high in crisis leadership, international relations, and pursuing equal justice for all. His worst categories were public persuasiveness and relations with Congress. There he came in sixteenth, behind Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Reagan.¹

Without casting aspersions on the judges (having been one myself), there is a contradiction between Truman's high and low scores. He placed his top priorities on international efforts from the Marshall Plan to US membership in NATO, which required congressional approval, and his accomplishments there made him "highly successful where he wanted to be."² His record on domestic legislation was less productive. Truman recommended programs to address significant issues ranging from national health insurance to civil rights and federal aid to education, but without a national consensus in the 1940s, these programs took another generation to enact. Still, Truman offered a more ambitious domestic agenda than

some of the presidents who scored higher than he did in congressional relations—notably Eisenhower, Ford, and Reagan—raising the question of whether asking too little from Congress deserves merit.

Presidents have courted the legislative branch ever since George Washington held weekly dinners on a rotating basis for members of Congress, but by the twentieth century, the chief executive had assumed the mantle of chief legislator and chief lobbyist. The media and the voting public, along with historians and political scientists, have measured presidents by how much they get enacted into law and how often their vetoes are sustained, their nominees confirmed, and their treaties ratified.

The different election cycle for president and Congress, as Lyndon Johnson pointed out, means that they run “on separate clocks.” Presidents come to office with powerful congressional committee chairs, who expect to outlast the president, already in place. Presidents seek to act quickly, taking advantage of the honeymoon months after the inauguration, while members of Congress prefer more incremental advancement. As a result, presidents appeal to the public to exert pressure on Congress for moving their bills faster. Since the president is not a prime minister, but holds office regardless of whether his party has the majority in Congress, passing legislation has also required the president to build bipartisan coalitions. Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Clinton, and both Bushes at times faced congressional majorities held by the opposition. Even when Truman had Democratic majorities in Congress—for six of his eight years as president—an alliance between conservative Southern Democrats and Republicans blocked his liberal initiatives. His experiences highlight a political truism that some presidents come to office with a full tank of gas while others start out on empty—circumstances that define their legislative effectiveness. In that respect, twelve years of the Depression and war had drained the tank for Harry Truman in 1945.³

HARRY S. TRUMAN

White House congressional relations neither started nor ended with Harry Truman, but as in so many other areas, he played an important transitional role. Truman inherited from Franklin D. Roosevelt an enlarged White House staff and a vastly enlarged federal government. He set out to regularize the functions Roosevelt had handled on an ad hoc basis, creating what political scientists have described as an “institutionalized” presidency. In dealing with Congress, Truman continued Roosevelt’s practice of weekly meetings with leaders of Congress and tapped the personal friendships he had made as a senator. He also put into place the elements of

congressional liaison for which his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, generally gets the credit.

It was Herbert Hoover who persuaded Congress in 1929 to expand the executive office staff from one secretary to three so that he could appoint Minnesota Representative Walter Newton to handle his congressional relations. Hoover has earned scant credit for this innovation, largely because his scorn for Congress as parochial and patronage-driven undercut Newton's efforts. President Roosevelt dispensed with Hoover's precedent and served as his own congressional liaison.⁴ The Democrats' sweeping victories in 1932 and 1934 swelled their ranks to two-thirds in both houses and allowed Roosevelt to dominate Congress throughout his first administration. When Roosevelt wanted something, he would send a special message to Congress, deliver a radio appeal to the nation, talk to the leadership, and dispatch a few aides to Capitol Hill to work behind the scenes. Operating at first with just a small White House staff, Roosevelt relied on his cabinet secretaries' legislative liaisons to handle routine requests from Congress—a process that enabled him to skirt some controversial issues, telling cabinet secretaries, "It's all your trouble, not mine."⁵

FDR ranked third on the C-SPAN poll after Lincoln and Washington, and first in congressional relations, but the system that worked so well for him during his first term unraveled during his second after his proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court split the Democratic Party. Conservative Democrats began voting with Republicans against his proposals, creating a legislative stalemate. After a protracted battle, Roosevelt managed to enlarge the White House staff through the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939. The act also shifted the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury Department to the White House, where it took the lead in clearing administration bills and agency proposals to Congress.⁶

Between 1937 and Roosevelt's death in 1945, Democrats lost ninety-two seats in the House and nineteen in the Senate. Although they retained slim majorities in both houses, effective control shifted to the conservative coalition. During the war, Roosevelt's leadership as commander in chief relegated Congress to the backseat and fanned resentment. Notably, in 1944, the Senate's Democratic majority leader, Alben Barkley, resigned in protest when Roosevelt vetoed a tax bill he had negotiated. Congress overrode the veto and Senate Democrats unanimously reelected Barkley as their leader—events that were vividly described by the journalist Allen Drury, who likened Roosevelt's relations with Congress by the end of his presidency to a toboggan going downhill. Harry Truman inherited Democratic majorities that were fractious, diminished, and exhausted after a dozen years of the Depression and war—a record number died in

office during the 79th Congress. Their constituents were pressuring them for relief from price controls and wartime taxes, and demanding that their sons in the military be brought home from overseas. This was hardly an optimal time to assume the presidency.⁷

With the war ending, Congress took a long summer recess and was scheduled to stay out until October 1945. Truman encouraged them to return to session a month earlier. Rather than wait until January for his State of the Union message, he sent Congress a compilation of his legislative objectives on September 21, 1945, the date he identified as his assumption of the presidency in his own right. The message detailing his 21-point program was so long that instead of delivering it in person, he let the clerks of the House and Senate read it for him, a decision that drained the drama from the event. His liberal message ran contrary to the conservative trends in the postwar Congress and encountered much resistance.⁸ One of the few parts Congress passed was the Employment Act of 1946, which fell far short of the full employment act that Truman had sought. Southern Democrats watered down the bill to prevent it from affecting racial policies in their region. Although New Dealers viewed this as a sign of Truman's incompetency, some historians have noted that Truman could have passed more of his program if he had abandoned pressing for fair treatment of African Americans and argued that his refusal to do so was a sign of strength rather than of weakness.⁹

Campaigning in 1946 under the slogan "Had Enough?" Republicans won majorities in the House and Senate. This pitted Truman against the Republican majority on domestic policy at the same time that he sought to collaborate with them on foreign policy. He managed this feat by cultivating the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) so assiduously that the ranking Democrat on the committee, Senator Tom Connally (D-TX), complained that he got "damn tired of hearing Vandenberg this and Vandenberg that."¹⁰

Republican opposition to his domestic legislation enabled Truman's campaign against the "Do-Nothing" 80th Congress. He won an improbable reelection in 1948, and Democrats took back the majority, but Truman had little success with the Democratic 81st and 82nd Congresses. Their failure to pass the education, health, and civil rights legislation he sought suggested he lacked the "power to persuade."¹¹ Truman's second term was also hounded by congressional investigations into corruption and communism in the government, with some of the hearings conducted, ironically, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations—the old "Truman Committee" that investigated the national defense program.

WHAT PRESIDENT TRUMAN THOUGHT OF CONGRESS AND HOW HE CHOSE TO DEAL WITH IT

Ken Hechler

Abraham Lincoln saved the Union. Harry Truman saved the world! Truman's greatest victories in Congress were scored in a series of significant legislation in foreign policy to contain Stalin's ruthless aggression. Aid to Greece and Turkey, the Truman Doctrine, the multibillion dollar Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Point Four program and the successful bipartisan foreign policy were all achieved through Truman's presidential leadership.¹

In his keynote address at the rededication of the Little White House, George McGovern delivered a brilliant address, with most of which I heartily agree. I was especially struck by his definition of national defense—that it should include not only the billions of dollars the Pentagon spends on military weapons but also funds for health care, education, housing, and those other necessities that constitute America's strength.²

I categorically disagree with McGovern's conclusion that Truman's Cold War measures were motivated by fear instead of a calm, unimpassioned appraisal of Stalin's real intentions. When Henry Wallace ran for president on the platform of the Progressive Party in 1948, that assessment of Truman's motives was Wallace's central theme, but we should recall that Senator McGovern publicly campaigned for Wallace in 1948.³ In addition to gobbling up nations like Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and other satellite countries, Stalin was sending arms, agents, and Communist advisers into Greece, Turkey, Italy, and France to foment Communist

takeovers in those free nations. It was not fear but a calm appraisal of the clear and present dangers to freedom that motivated Truman's establishment of the containment policy, which proved so successful in the long run.⁴

A jarring confrontation between Senator Truman and the White House in 1937 had a profound effect on President Truman's later attitude toward relations with Congress. The death of Senate Democratic leader Joseph Robinson of Arkansas in July 1937 ushered in a bitter, close fight for his position. President Roosevelt publicly endorsed Kentucky Senator Alben Barkley over Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison. Senator Truman liked Harrison and committed to vote for him. A head count revealed that Harrison might win by one vote, so Roosevelt put on a full-court press to change votes. Chicago's "Boss" Kelly persuaded Illinois Senator William Dieterich to switch by offering to turn over a big amount of Kelly's patronage to Dieterich.⁵ Roosevelt's next step was to ask Kansas City boss Tom Pendergast to call Senator Truman and ask him to switch to Barkley. Truman told Pendergast that he had already committed to Harrison, whereupon Pendergast remarked that "It doesn't make a helluva lot of difference to me, but President Roosevelt has asked me to call." Truman was boiling mad. He resented the implication that he was a puppet of Pendergast, especially since he was determined to erase the charge that he was the "senator from Pendergast."⁶ Infuriated, Senator Truman called the White House to express his anger directly to the president. Roosevelt's press secretary, Steve Early, came on the phone to say the president was "unavailable," whereupon Truman gave Early both barrels, stating that he was "tired of being pushed around" and "treated like an office boy."⁷

This confrontation led to President Truman's decision to treat United States senators as dignitaries who deserved to be contacted personally by the president, instead of through surrogates. Not until 1949—four years after taking the oath of office—did President Truman finally decide to appoint Joseph Feeney for the Senate and Charles Maylon for the House as liaison representatives to Congress. I knew both Feeney and Maylon, and talked with them many times about their contacts with Congress. Neither of them had a working knowledge of policy, and both of them acted as sounding boards for members of Congress, while giving little attention to important details. When asked to appraise congressional reaction to future votes, they would frequently simply ask the Speaker or Senate majority leader and report their response. Therefore, I believe it is an exaggeration to state that President Truman institutionalized the system of congressional liaison. These two men were not important members of Truman's White House staff. Their lack of importance is directly traceable to Senator Truman's experience with President Roosevelt in 1937.⁸ George Elsey, a senior administrative

assistant in the Truman White House, confirmed my appraisal of Feeney and Maylon, adding, "To my knowledge, neither of these two men ever met with President Truman. Essentially, they were glorified errand boys for Appointments Secretary Matt Connelly, who would send them out to buy tickets to sporting events needed by congressmen or to fill minor requests from congressmen for documents or other special favors."⁹

TRUMAN'S FAIR DEAL

At the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Truman sent an urgent message to Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, who had been FDR's number one speechwriter and was held over to work for Truman. The president asked Rosenman to join him on the return trip to the United States on the destroyer *Augusta*. Truman advised Rosenman that he did not want to wait for a formal State of the Union address to lay out in detail his domestic agenda in a comprehensive message to Congress. The result was a wide-ranging, sixteen thousand-word message sent to Capitol Hill on September 6, 1945. Rosenman was elated to learn that the message would be a bold, liberal statement that carried forward the aims of the New Deal.¹⁰

The message was a liberal smorgasbord that included national health insurance, a boost in unemployment compensation, an increase in the minimum wage from forty to seventy-five cents an hour, housing and slum clearance, crop insurance for farmers, tax reform, a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee to replace the wartime FEPC, and a host of industrial reconversion initiatives—more than enough for a reluctant Congress to digest.¹¹ Congress proceeded to oppose most of the recommendations, worthy as they were.

During the next year and a half, Truman struggled unsuccessfully to hold the line against runaway inflation. The Office of Price Administration, which had employed seventy-three thousand workers during World War II, was dismantled over Truman's strenuous objection, as the people, who in the aftermath of World War I had voted Warren Harding into office in 1920 on the ungrammatical platform of "Back to Normalcy," now wanted to abandon wartime sacrifices and get drunk on freedom from controls. Organized labor, chafing under no-strike wartime pledges, saw corporations reaping record profits while prices were escalating out of reach. Virtually every large industry—steel, railroads, coal mining, transportation—vented their anger with crippling nationwide strikes. At the Gridiron Dinner in December, Truman—only half in jest—proclaimed that Civil War General Sherman was wrong when he said "war is hell." He

CONGRESS AND TRUMAN

A Clash of Parties and Personalities

Raymond W. Smock

By almost all accounts, President Truman's relationship with Congress was stormy, contentious, exasperating, and often unproductive. Yet, looking back from a perspective of more than a half century, he accomplished a great deal. Harry Truman's star in the presidential firmament has risen to new heights, even though he once was among the lowest-rated presidents in history.

This volume explores Truman's relationship with Congress from a number of perspectives. My focus is on Truman's conflicted relationship with Congress from the perspective of Congress rather than the presidency. I draw my inspiration from an article first published in 1975 by Harold Hyman, the Rice University historian, who wrote about Abraham Lincoln, not Harry Truman. His article was titled: "Lincoln and Congress: Why Not Congress and Lincoln?" He reminded us that since so much of our understanding of American presidents comes from the perspective of the White House, we need to balance this with the view from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Congress may be a coequal branch of government under the Constitution, but it certainly has not been coequal in presidential studies.

To explain how the House and Senate viewed Truman's relationship with Congress, we need to look at the congressional parties during Truman's presidency, major internal changes in the House and Senate committee system, shifting House and Senate coalitions, and whether the clashes between Congress and the president were domestic in nature or related to foreign policy. A good part of this tale can be found in the personalities and politics

of individual members and how they interacted with the president's own strong personality.

On July 23, 1947, President Harry Truman broke the rules of the Senate by slipping into the Senate chamber while it was in session and sitting in his old seat. The *New York Times* reported that he sat there "beaming like a school boy" because it took the Senate by such surprise. It was the first time a president of the United States had entered the Senate chamber during regular business since George Washington did it in 1789. Unlike George Washington, Harry Truman was not there to conduct business; he did it on a dare from some Democratic members of the Senate. The chamber erupted into applause as the Republican-dominated 80th Congress greeted the president with great gusto. The galleries joined in the warm greeting and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who was presiding, did nothing to stop the applause. Vandenberg then broke a Senate rule of his own when he said, "The ex-senator from Missouri is recognized for five minutes." President Truman was cordial and gracious in his remarks, saying that he "sometimes got homesick for this seat. I spent what I think were the best ten years of my life in the Senate. I made friendships and had associations which I can never forget."¹

But first, a note on the meaning of the word "Congress." We use shorthand by calling something "congressional" or calling the legislative branch "Congress," and have done so since the beginning of our government, but we know that the term "Congress" describes that two-headed beast so many presidents have lambasted. Such shorthand often obscures the significant differences presidents have had working separately with the House and the Senate, and obscures the differences between these two bodies and how they function under the Constitution with differing responsibilities, especially with the Senate's significant role in foreign relations and its approval of Supreme Court nominations. Further muddying the waters is the balance between the majority and minority parties in each chamber, and the shifting coalitions between the parties that have often acted as a four-party system rather than a two-party system.² All this is enough for any president to feel beset by yapping dogs—and I have not yet mentioned individual personalities and how they might clash over a particular issue.

Harry Truman repeated in his memoir that his years in the Senate were the happiest years of his life. He liked the excitement, the company of his colleagues, and the clubby atmosphere of the Senate. He made a lot of friends there. Franklin Roosevelt was midway through his first term as president when Harry Truman entered the Senate in 1935, and Truman looked forward to pushing the president's programs with the nation in the throes of the Great Depression. As a student of American history, Truman

appreciated the Senate in its historical context. He took a keen interest in all senators; he studied their biographies and learned the rules of the Senate, which is still the secret to success in that body.³

Truman thrived in the Senate, making a national reputation for himself as a fair and diligent investigator of wasteful government spending in wartime. His Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program became known as the Truman Committee and put him on the national map. Truman saved the nation billions of dollars in defense spending and saved the lives of members of the armed forces by exposing faulty manufacturing and dangerous equipment rushed into production by a self-serving, war-profiteering element in defense contracting.⁴

Truman's attitudes about the Senate and the House were shaped by his personal experience, his own, well-honed views of what a good senator was like, and the friends and enemies he made while serving on Capitol Hill. It should come as no surprise that when Harry Truman thought of the perfect member of Congress, he thought of himself: hard working, honest, willing to find solutions to tough problems, practical, realistic, and always focused on the big picture of what was best for America. What he found instead were too many "ignorant demagogues" to suit him.⁵

When that famous phone call came on April 12, 1945, requesting that Harry Truman get to the White House as fast as he could, Truman had been vice president for less than four months. He was still a creature of the Senate, serving as the Senate's president and enjoying a new role that kept him largely in the Senate chamber but with better contact with the White House. He had spent the afternoon of April 12 presiding over the Senate before heading over for a drink with his good friend House Speaker Sam Rayburn and House Parliamentarian Lew Deschler in Rayburn's private hideaway, known as the Board of Education, down a back stairway below the House chamber, well ensconced inside the comfort and contentment of congressional culture at its finest. Hours later he would be sworn in as Roosevelt's successor and find himself ripped out of the familiar political culture of the Senate and thrust into another.

Three weeks into his presidency, on June 6, 1945, Truman wrote to his wife, Bess, that he was getting better organized and straightening out his cabinet. He thought that when he ironed out a few problems he would be able to sit back, look at the big picture, and tell his departments what to do, and that his job would be no more difficult than running Jackson County, Missouri. He knew he would have "big headaches" in foreign relations, national finance, reconversion, and postwar military policy, but thought they "can all be solved if the Congress decides to help me do a bang up job, and [I] believe they will do that."⁶



HARRY S. TRUMAN
AND CONGRESS
A Graphic Essay Based
on the Holdings of the
Harry S. Truman Library

Raymond H. Geselbracht

money in it. I was very very im-
 pressionable when I was a kid and
 I believed all the Sunday school books
 and idealist dope we were taught
 and it's taken me twenty odd years
 to find that ~~so~~ Mark is right when
 he says that the boy who stole the
 jam and lied about it and killed the
 cat and sassed his ma grew up
 and became a highly honored citizen
 and was sent to Congress; is abso-
 lutely right. The poor gink who

Letter, Truman to Bess Wallace, n.d. [postmarked May 28, 1917], excerpt. Truman Papers: Papers Relating to Family, Business, and Personal Affairs.

When Harry Truman was a young man, he learned to turn to Mark Twain for wisdom about the world, and one of the things that great sage enlightened him about was Congress. “I was very, very impressionable when I was a kid,” he wrote in 1917 to his fiancée, Bess Wallace, “and I believed all the Sunday school books and idealist dope we were taught and it’s taken me twenty-odd years to find that Mark [Twain] is right when he says that the boy who stole the jam and lied about it and killed the cat and sassed his ma, grew up and became a highly honored citizen and was sent to Congress....”



Photograph 96-344: President Harry S. Truman in the early days of his presidency, inscribed to Assistant Press Secretary Eban Ayers, May 7, 1945.

On June 6, 1945, when Truman was still learning the job of being president, he wrote to Bess Truman about some of his expectations concerning his new job. He was a natural optimist and was willing, in the heady early weeks of his presidency, to think that Congress would be good to him. “Well I’m getting better organized now . . .,” he wrote. “It won’t be long until I can sit back and study the whole picture and tell ’em what is to be done in each department. . . . Foreign relations, national finances, reconversion, and a postwar military policy will be the big headaches—and they can all be solved if the Congress decides to help me do a bang-up job, and I believe they will do that.”

¹Harry S. Truman to Bess Truman, June 6, 1945, Truman Papers: Papers Relating to Family, Business, and Personal Affairs.



Photograph 2002-59: Matthew J. Connelly, ca. 1945.

If there was any activity in the Truman White House before the spring or summer of 1949 that could be called congressional liaison, it was probably centered on Matthew J. Connelly, Truman's appointments secretary. Connelly occupied a prime spot right outside the president's office and he probably had more frequent contact with Truman than anyone else in the administration. He was the person people went to if they wanted to meet with or talk by telephone with the president, including members of Congress. He was the coordinator of Truman's own liaison with Congress, informing him which members wanted to meet and talk with him, advising him to call this or that senator or congressman about some matter or other, arranging with Truman his meetings with senators and congressmen.

HARRY S. TRUMAN AND CONGRESS

Presidential Effectiveness and the Liberal Scorecard

Alonzo L. Hamby

Not long after Harry Truman left the presidency, the noted radio commentator Elmer Davis summed up a widespread impression of the former chief executive's efforts to extend Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal:

All in all, in domestic affairs, Mr. Truman was an unsuccessful President. [He] presented... a liberal program which was coherent and logical as the New Deal had never been. Congress, not being liberal, refused to take it; yet every year he persisted in offering it all to them again and they still wouldn't take it. ... Truman kept asking for all of it and getting none of it.¹

Davis was among the most perceptive observers of post-World War II American politics, but it is debatable whether a "liberal scorecard" analysis is the best method of evaluating Truman's congressional relations on domestic issues. Reflecting the aspirations of a non-Communist left inspired by Roosevelt's promise of a postwar "economic bill of rights" and by the sweeping reforms of the Labour Party in Britain, the Davis evaluation rather uncritically assumes that a host of initiatives that could be labeled "liberal" were both feasible and in the public interest. Nonetheless, these assumptions remain generally accepted. Because Davis's description possessed a surface accuracy, his conclusion that Truman was unsuccessful in domestic affairs has stuck. What has not stuck is the context that Truman inherited. Nor have historians given adequate attention to a record of incremental change and agenda setting that, all things considered, was substantial.

Harry Truman succeeded a president who had become an instant legend, endowed with powers not available to real historical figures. In the liberal imagination, Roosevelt had tumbled down walls of resistance with a single speech. Truman, by contrast, seemed an inept little man incapable of rallying the nation behind a virtuous progressive program.² Who will deny that Truman lacked Roosevelt's charisma or that he could not make nearly as good a speech? But are charisma and speech making the primary tools of legislative achievement? Was the liberal fixation on these qualities an implicit admission of their program's relative lack of popular appeal?

Truman, like his predecessor, faced not simply "Congress," but a different Congress every two years, each with its own context of different possibilities and expectations. Consider the following comparisons of Roosevelt's first four Congresses with Truman's:

ROOSEVELT I (1933-34)

Party divisions: Senate: 60 Democrats, 35 Republicans, 1 Other; House: 310 Democrats, 117 Republicans, 5 Others.³

Franklin Roosevelt took office near the end of the Great Depression. Mass unemployment, collapsing agricultural prices, ebbing industrial output, and a nationwide banking shutdown captured the nation's attention; there was little public interest in foreign policy issues. Sweeping New Deal reform legislation was passed, and Democrats made significant gains in midterm elections.

TRUMAN I (1945-46 [ELECTED WITH ROOSEVELT AT THE HEAD OF THE DEMOCRATIC TICKET IN 1944])

Party divisions: Senate: 56 Democrats, 38 Republicans, 1 Other; House: 242 Democrats, 190 Republicans, 2 Others.

Truman became president in the closing months of World War II, when there was great concern about foreign policy but equal concern with the possibility of a returning Great Depression. A turbulent conversion of the economy from war to peace was disrupted by labor strikes, inflation, and shortages of consumer goods. The administration had nominal majorities in both houses of Congress, but lost control of both in midterm elections.

ROOSEVELT II (1935-36)

Party divisions: Senate: 69 Democrats, 25 Republicans, 2 Others; House: 319 Democrats, 103 Republicans, 10 Others.

The public and the administration continued a near-exclusive focus on the Depression and pursuit of controversial domestic reforms, including the Wagner and Social Security Acts. Massive relief programs for the unemployed fueled an apparent returning prosperity in 1936. In the fall elections, Democrats won even greater majorities in both houses of Congress.

TRUMAN II (1947-48)

Party divisions: Senate: 45 Democrats, 51 Republicans; House: 188 Democrats, 246 Republicans, 1 Other.

Public and administration attention was divided about equally between domestic and foreign concerns. A generally prosperous full-employment economy was marred by a high rate of inflation. Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act was overridden. His pathbreaking civil rights program got nowhere on Capitol Hill. The Cold War emerged and became the focus of public attention; with significant Republican support, the administration secured passage of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Truman won reelection and the Democrats regained control of Congress.

ROOSEVELT III (1937-38)

Party divisions: Senate: 76 Democrats, 16 Republicans, 4 Others; House: 331 Democrats, 89 Republicans, 13 Others.

Although Democratic majorities seemed overwhelming, President Roosevelt suffered stunning defeats in attempts to pack the Supreme Court and to secure an ambitious executive reorganization plan that would have drastically increased the power of the presidency. A serious recession aborted economic recovery. Foreign policy became increasingly salient with the Panay and Munich crises. A "conservative coalition" began to emerge in Congress. In 1938, Roosevelt was largely unsuccessful in an effort to purge hostile members of his party. Republicans made strong gains in midterm elections.

TRUMAN III (1949-50)

Party divisions: Senate: 54 Democrats, 42 Republicans; House: 263 Democrats, 171 Republicans.

Elected in his own right, the president proposed an ambitious "Fair Deal" domestic program that included large-scale housing assistance, federal aid to education, civil rights, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, and a major new agricultural program designed to support farm income rather than

TRUMAN, ANTICOMMUNISM, AND CONGRESS

Robert David Johnson

In C-SPAN's 2009 Presidential Leadership Survey, Harry Truman ranked fifth among the roster of the nation's presidents, the same position he occupied in the original C-SPAN poll nine years before.¹ Of the ten categories rated by C-SPAN's panelists, however, Truman scored the worst in relations with Congress (sixteenth). That result repeated his lowest ranking from the 2000 poll.² As several of the essays in this volume attest, this ranking is somewhat unfair. In many respects, historians have penalized Truman for proposing an ambitious domestic and international agenda to Congress—as opposed to the more limited programs of presidents such as Dwight Eisenhower, Gerald Ford, or Ronald Reagan, each of whom received higher evaluations on relations with Congress in the C-SPAN survey. But Truman's own record of mishandling of congressional anti-Communist hysteria undoubtedly contributed to his poor ranking. McCarthyism, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the McCarran Internal Security Act were decidedly low points in the history of Congress, and Truman's administration was ineffective, at best, in resisting these legislative assaults on civil liberties.

That said, Truman was operating from a position of weakness in addressing any legislative inquiry focused on the real or imagined threats posed by domestic communism. The Republican Party's assuming control of both houses of Congress in 1947 coincided with major crises throughout non-Communist Europe. The president responded by requesting from Congress massive US assistance first to Greece and Turkey, and then to Western Europe. Without reliable support from members of his own party,

especially in the Senate, Truman had little choice but to rationalize the request for aid as part of a worldwide anti-Communist crusade. In a famous White House meeting with congressional leaders, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson delivered an impassioned, dire prediction of Europe's fate should the United States refuse to act.³

Framing foreign policy in starkly ideological terms ensured congressional approval for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, but it left the administration ill-equipped to confront members of Congress determined to prosecute the Cold War at home as vigorously as Truman wished to do abroad.

When Republicans regained control of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections, the likelihood of bipartisan cooperation on national security matters seemed slim. Indeed, based on the most recent past precedents, Congress, not the executive, appeared more likely to shape foreign policy in 1947 and 1948. After the 1918 midterm elections, the newly installed GOP majority leader and Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. (R-MA), used parliamentary maneuvers to ensure a lengthy delay before considering Woodrow Wilson's work in Paris. By the time the president's peace plan reached the Senate in autumn 1919, the Treaty of Versailles failed to manage even majority support.⁴ The next president to confront divided government, Herbert Hoover, likewise lost initiative on national security matters to Congress. With a coalition of Democrats and progressive Republicans exercising *de facto* control of the Senate, upper chamber opposition forced the administration to dramatically curtail US military ventures in the Caribbean Basin.⁵

In two respects Truman occupied an even worse position than Wilson or Hoover. First, like Wilson but unlike Hoover, the loss of congressional control by Truman's political party was accompanied almost immediately by a major foreign policy crisis. On February 21, 1947, the British government announced that it no longer could provide assistance to the right-of-center Greek government. The Truman administration immediately offered financial aid for Greece and also for Turkey, which had recently refused a Soviet demand to cede territory on the nations' joint border and allow Soviet bases on Turkish soil. But the State Department anticipated "grave difficulties in obtaining support from the economy-minded Congress," especially since the administration wanted \$150 million in military aid, \$50 million in reconstruction assistance, and \$100 million in economic aid to Greece; and \$100 million in arms for Turkey.⁶

Unlike both Wilson and Hoover, Truman lacked reliable support from his own party—on national security matters, at least. Dean Acheson tartly observed that the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, Tom Connally (D-TX), “often does not understand what he is told.”⁷ (Once, when asked his opinion about Europe, Connally replied, “The plantations over there are very small”; on another occasion, the Texas senator claimed that the United States had fought Poland during World War II.⁸) Acheson entertained a similarly low opinion of the committee’s next ranking Democrat, Walter George (D-GA), and he dismissed another committee Democrat, Brien McMahon (D-CT), as the senator “who wants to fight a preventive war.”⁹ The committee Democrats’ most creative thinker, Claude Pepper (D-FL), was no administration ally: he would attempt a liberal coup against Truman in the run-up to the 1948 convention, and in any case hardly shared the president’s worldview. *Newsweek* dubbed the Florida senator “Red Pepper,” since “when Russia called, he rallied—and rallies again.”¹⁰

While Truman might have lacked the same level of party support as Wilson and Hoover, a key element of the opposition was more willing to cooperate with him than had occurred with his predecessors. Though most Republicans had embraced an isolationist foreign policy before World War II, some powerful Senate Republicans—led by Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), who became Foreign Relations Committee chairman in 1947—now championed the idea of a bipartisan approach to international affairs. Truman welcomed the concept, though he privately defined it much differently than Vandenberg, as “simply saying that the president can repose confidence in the members of the other party and that in turn the leaders of the party have confidence in the President’s conduct of foreign affairs.”¹¹

This Republican support, however, came with a price: to frame the European aid request in starkly ideological terms. Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), a key Vandenberg ally and a self-described “strong internationalist,” envisioned the Cold War as a contest of ideas between the United States and the USSR, since resisting Communist expansionism could not occur through an approach dominated by “balancing of power.”¹² Another Vandenberg confidante, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (R-MA), likewise pointed to traditional US internationalist and anticolonialist tenets as a way to distinguish the United States from the Soviets. (In this respect, the Massachusetts senator was as much an ideological heir of Woodrow Wilson as of his namesake.) Lodge maintained that pressure from Congress and especially the legislative opposition could force “the President to raise his sights” away from the particulars of party politics.¹³

Justifying Cold War foreign policy in a manner more consistent with promoting democracy, human rights, and self-determination distinguished Vandenberg, Lodge, and Smith not only from many Truman advisors but also from committee Democrats who backed the administration’s

WINNING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE WORLD Truman, Foreign Policy, and the Eightieth Congress

Susan M. Hartmann

“I always kept in mind the lesson of Wilson’s failure in 1920,” Harry Truman wrote in his memoirs, referring to the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and refusal to join the League of Nations. Truman believed that if Woodrow Wilson had taken Senate leaders into his confidence and been sensitive “to the feelings on Capitol Hill,” he might have won congressional support for his foreign policy. For his part, Truman approached post–World War II foreign policy with the determination “to work in close co-operation with Congress and... to avoid the mistakes which had led to the disillusionment of the American people” after World War I. A great believer in the lessons that one could learn from history, Truman studied Wilson’s writings and speeches and examined the Senate debate on the Versailles Treaty: “I meant to have legislative co-operation,” he averred.¹

In these accounts of his determination to avoid Wilson’s failure, Truman referred principally to the creation of the United Nations. He had agreed with Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to include ranking Republicans on the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees in the delegation to the UN conference in San Francisco in 1945, and as president he met with them to discuss plans for the new international body. In addition, Truman appointed key Republicans to the delegations that negotiated peace treaties with Italy and Japan and created the Organization of

American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Their presence at the negotiating table not only gave these Republican leaders a voice while the policy was being made, it also gave them a huge investment in gaining ratification by the Senate. Moreover, Republican participation in negotiating the treaties lent credibility to the documents in the eyes of the Republicans who would vote on them.

Treaty making was just one element in the transformation of US foreign policy during the Truman years. The president also sought approval for the very first legislation of the Cold War, establishing the instruments of a containment policy that would define US foreign policy for the next forty years. The decisions that Congress ratified in extending aid to Greece and Turkey and in authorizing and funding the Marshall Plan represented a sharp break with the past, marking the beginning of a permanent global involvement that required vast and continuous military commitments unimaginable before the 1940s.

While he armed himself with the lessons from history, Truman knew that he faced stiff obstacles as he took the steps toward a fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the United States and the world. As World War II ended, the general public, as well as servicemen themselves, clamored for rapid demobilization and an end to wartime controls. In public opinion polls, Americans placed international issues far down on their list of pressing concerns. The war left an enormous debt along with severe domestic problems of inflation, shortages, and labor strife. Much of the public was either indifferent to foreign affairs or wary about their nation continuing to invest human and material resources far from its shores.²

Above all, persuading Congress became much more difficult after the 1946 elections. Republican campaign slogans asked “Had Enough?” and jeered “To Err is Truman.” Their capture of a majority of seats in Congress suggested a tremendous repudiation of Truman and his party. Gaining a 245 to 188 margin in the House and outnumbering Senate democrats by 51 to 45, Republicans looked on the election as the first step to regaining the White House in 1948.³

Reflecting voters’ priorities, the election campaigns focused on domestic issues—inflation, shortages of food, housing and other goods, remaining wartime controls, and strikes and other labor problems.⁴ When Republicans did appeal to anxieties about national security, they spotlighted internal subversion—in the words of the Republican National Committee, the “infiltration of alien-minded radicals” into high positions in the federal government.⁵ Moreover, two Republican themes, prominent in the 1946 campaigns and rooted in conservative ideology, posed major problems for the Truman administration in selling a new foreign policy.

First, Republicans were horrified at the expansion of executive powers under Roosevelt. They wanted to preserve representative government and individual freedom by reasserting Congress's authority. Second, to bolster free enterprise and the private sector, Republicans demanded tax cuts and drastic reductions in federal spending.⁶ Funding for any foreign initiatives would require support from the House Appropriations Committee chaired by John Taber (R-NY)—nicknamed “Meat Axe”—who promised to use a “sledge hammer” to the administration's budget.⁷

Truman also had to worry about potential defections from his own party. Conservative Southern Democrats, such as Harry Byrd of Virginia and Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, agreed with Republicans on the need to slash federal spending. On the left, legislators such as Claude Pepper of Florida and Glen Taylor of Idaho, believed with Henry Wallace (the secretary of commerce whom Truman had pushed out of the cabinet because of his foreign policy views) that the hardening of US policy in 1946 and its insensitivity to the Soviet Union's genuine security needs were poisoning superpower relations. Leftists were also concerned about the potential of US actions to undermine the United Nations and to violate American values by shoring up European empires and supporting undemocratic and repressive regimes abroad.⁸

A public largely apathetic about America's relations with the world; a recent repudiation by the electorate; a Congress dominated by Republicans who had been chafing to shrink government and taxes and regain the presidency for more than a decade; and an incohesive Democratic party—these formed the setting in which Truman engineered the greatest change in the history of US foreign policy.

GAINING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

The new Republican majority in Congress was sworn in just as the administration was reaching near consensus on the need to take the decisive step of replacing Britain as the guarantor of Greek and Turkish security. In 1946 the Soviet expert and diplomat George Kennan had circulated his famous Long Telegram calling for a policy of “containment” and Winston Churchill had delivered his Iron Curtain Speech calling for an Anglo-American effort to stop Soviet expansion. The United States had exercised its diplomatic power and a show of military force to deflect Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey, but these actions did not require congressional approval. Then in February 1947 Britain formally announced that it could no longer provide military and economic support to the governments in Turkey and Greece. Turkey was striving to strengthen its military as well as resisting pressures

TRUMAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY Constitutional Issues

Louis Fisher

The presidency of Harry Truman receives deservedly good marks for actions it took after World War II to rescue Europe and surrounding countries from economic and political turmoil. In early 1947, learning that England lacked the resources to protect Greece and Turkey from Soviet influence, Truman asked Congress to provide \$250 million in aid to Greece and \$150 million to Turkey, all part of what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine.¹ Truman's message to Congress on March 12 of that year urged the United States to adopt the policy of supporting "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."² The Greek-Turkish aid program passed Congress with significant bipartisan support.³ Truman followed this plan with an ambitious effort in 1948 to help with European reconstruction. The goal was to avoid a repeat of the harsh economic conditions that existed after World War I when the level of suffering and despair did much to build support for the Nazi Party and other totalitarian regimes. Truman's program committed \$12 billion in economic aid to sixteen countries in Western Europe. The Economic Recovery Program, popularly called the Marshall Plan, provided financial assistance over a four-year period to stabilize those countries and prevent Communist or Fascist control.

Yet, in deciding to take a strong stand against Soviet and Communist expansionism, several of Truman's initiatives did great damage to individual rights and constitutional principles in the United States. The first was

his executive order in 1947 that created loyalty review boards in the federal government. Thousands of innocent employees were fired from their jobs on the basis of information they had no right to see or challenge. Long before Senator Joe McCarthy (R-WI) began his campaign against “enemies from within,” Truman used the fear of communism and subversion to divide the country and strip individuals of basic procedural safeguards.

A second damaging policy was the treatment of aliens who came to the United States, even those who had married American husbands. Similar to the treatment of federal employees, they were designated “security risks” on the basis of information they had no right to see. At times they were expelled from the country. On other occasions they were held on Ellis Island for years on the basis of uncorroborated hearsay evidence, with that evidence withheld from them and the courts. The experience of Ellen Knauff, who was kept on Ellis Island from 1948 to 1951, is recounted later in this chapter.

Third, President Truman took the country to war against North Korea in 1950 without ever going to Congress for authorization. It was the first time in more than 160 years that a president unilaterally took the nation from a state of peace to a state of war without seeking and obtaining congressional approval. Truman sought “authority” not from Congress but from the United Nations Security Council. Nothing in the Constitution, practice, or the UN Charter anticipated that the UN Security Council would function as a substitute for Congress. Other presidents, including George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, relied on Truman’s initiative to circumvent the elected officials of Congress.

LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD

Efforts to suppress communism and subversion had been a prominent theme in US politics from World War I throughout the 1930s. In 1930, US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer gave a House committee a list of six organizations that the Justice Department had determined to be of “revolutionary character.” What criteria merited inclusion on the list was never explained, other than “anarchist” beliefs, even if unrelated to criminal or violent activities. In 1939 and 1940, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover instructed his agency to develop a secret list of organizations considered to be Communist or Communist-front. The organizations were not given notice of why they were put on the list or an opportunity to offer rejections at a hearing.⁴

Fears of communism and fascism during World War II created pressures within the United States for some type of loyalty pledge that citizens

and aliens would have to sign. In 1942, a group called Bundles for America drafted the text of "A Pledge for Americans." It expressed pride in being an American and supported "loyally and in friendship" all the countries in the world that were joined in the fight against the Axis powers. The pledge ended with "So help me God!" Those who drafted the language appeared to be aware of the harm that can come from superpatriotism. Individuals signing the pledge were directed not to listen to "idle rumors" or repeat "destructive gossip."⁵

In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9300 creating an interdepartmental committee to review allegations that federal employees were engaged in "subversive activity."⁶ He acted shortly after Representative Martin Dies (D-TX), chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities (the Dies Committee), claimed that hundreds of federal employees were affiliated with Communist groups or causes. The executive order directed departments and agencies to refer suspect employees to the FBI for investigation. The previous year, Attorney General Francis Biddle had released a report stating that thirty-six federal employees had been discharged for activities associated with alleged subversive organizations. Of those discharged, only two were on the list of 1,100 names assembled by the Dies Committee.⁷

Looking back on his lengthy career with the federal government, Clark Clifford said his "greatest regret" was that he did not "make more an an effort to try to kill the loyalty program at its inception in 1947–48." Truman and his advisors may have calculated that their initiative would deter Congress from acting in ways even more damaging to civil liberties. However, the loyalty program invited abuse by heightening the belief that communism threatened the operations of government and the private sector. On March 25, 1947, President Harry Truman issued procedures for determining the loyalty of federal employees.⁸ His executive order claimed that the presence within the government "of any disloyal or subversive person" constituted a threat to democratic processes, but the order did not include a clear definition or understanding of either loyalty or subversion. In an effort to guard against abusive and irresponsible charges, Truman insisted on safeguards to protect individuals "from unfounded accusations of disloyalty."⁹ Yet the safeguards were minimal. The executive order permitted federal agencies to rely on secret informants whose identities and credibility could be withheld from the accused.

The loyalty program covered two categories: individuals seeking jobs with the federal government and those already employed. Applicants for a civilian position needed to undergo a loyalty investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and existing federal employees

CONTRIBUTORS

RICHARD S. CONLEY is associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research is focused on presidential-congressional relations and comparative executives and legislatures. He is author of *The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government: A Postwar Assessment* (2002), *Historical Dictionary of the Reagan-Bush Era* (2007), and *Historical Dictionary of the George W. Bush Era* (2009), and editor of *Reassessing the Reagan Presidency* (2003), and *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terror* (2004).

MICHAEL J. DEVINE is director of the Harry S. Truman Library and president of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs. He has also served as the director of the American Heritage Center at the University of Wyoming, the Illinois state preservation officer, and assistant director of the Ohio Historical Society. He has been a Fulbright lecturer in Korea and Argentina, and has taught at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies. He is the author of *John W. Foster: Politics and Diplomacy in the Imperial Era, 1873–1917* (1981).

LOUIS FISHER is scholar in residence at the Constitution Project. Previously he worked for four decades at the Library of Congress as senior specialist in separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service and specialist in constitutional law at the Law Library. He has testified before several congressional committees investigating such issues as war powers, state secrets, CIA whistle-blowing, covert spending, NSA surveillance, executive privilege, and presidential impoundment authority. He is the author of more than fifteen books, including *Presidential War Power* (revised edition 2004), *Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President* (revised edition 1991), *Military Tribunals and Presidential Power* (2005), and *Congress and the Constitution* (2011).

RAY GESELBRACHT is special assistant to the director of the Harry S. Truman Library. He also served at the Richard M. Nixon Presidential

Materials Project and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. He holds a doctorate in history from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He is the coeditor of *Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson* (2010) and editor of *The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman* (2007), and has published many articles about Harry Truman, the Truman Library, and other historical and archival subjects.

ALONZO L. HAMBY is Distinguished Professor of History at Ohio University, where he specializes in twentieth century US history, especially politics and culture. His books include *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (1975), *The Imperial Years: The United States since 1939* (1976), *Liberalism and Its Challengers: F.D.R. to Reagan* (revised edition 1992), *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (1995), and *For the Survival of Democracy: Franklin Roosevelt and the World Crisis of the 1930s* (2004).

SUSAN M. HARTMANN is professor of history at Ohio State University, where she has specialized in twentieth-century American history and women's history. She is the author of several books including *Truman and the 80th Congress* (1971), *From Margin to Mainstream: American Women and Politics since 1960* (1989), and *The Other Feminists: Activists in the Liberal Establishment* (1998). She has served on the board of directors of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute and was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

KEN HECHLER served on President Truman's White House staff from 1949 to 1953. He was a member of the US House of Representatives from 1959 to 1977, and served as the secretary of state of West Virginia from 1985 to 2001. In 1965, he was the only member of Congress to march with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. at Selma, Alabama. He has written several books including *Working with Truman: A Personal Memoir of the White House Years* (1982), and the bestselling *The Bridge at Ramagen* (1957). He has taught at Columbia University, Princeton University, Barnard College, and Marshall University.

ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON is professor of history at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His areas of specialization include US foreign relations, American political parties, the American presidency, and the CIA and American democracy. His books include *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (1995), and *Congress and the Cold War* (2005), and with Stuart Taylor Jr. *Until*

Proven Innocent: Political Correctness and the Shameful Injustices of the Duke Lacrosse Rape Case (2007).

BURTON I. KAUFMAN is adjunct professor of history at the University of Utah and former dean and professor of history and interdisciplinary studies at Miami University of Ohio. He is the author of ten books, including *The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr.* (1993, revised edition with Scott Kaufman, 2006), *The Korean Conflict* (1999), *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (1986), and *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961* (1982).

GEORGE S. MCGOVERN served as a US representative and senator from South Dakota and was the Democratic candidate for president in 1972. During World War II he enlisted in the US Army Air Corps and flew combat missions in Europe. He received a PhD in history from Northwestern University and was professor of history and government at Dakota Wesleyan University. His books include *Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern* (1977), *Terry: My Daughter's Life-and-Death Struggle with Alcoholism* (1996), *The Essential America: Our Founders and the Liberal Tradition* (2004), and *Abraham Lincoln* (2009).

DONALD A. RITCHIE is historian of the US Senate. An occasional commentator on congressional history on C-SPAN and National Public Radio, he is the author of several books including *Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents* (1991), *Reporting from Washington: The History of the Washington Press Corps* (2005), *Electing FDR: The New Deal Campaign of 1932* (2007), and *The U.S. Congress: A Very Short Introduction* (2010).

RAYMOND W. SMOCK is director of the Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies at Shepherd University. From 1983 to 1995 he served as historian of the US House of Representatives and oversaw the preparation of *The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress* and other reference works relating to Congress. He is the editor (with others) of *Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries* (1998), and *Congress Investigates: A Critical and Documentary History* (2010); and the author of *Booker T. Washington: Black Leadership in the Age of Jim Crow* (2009).

ROBERT P. WATSON is professor and director of American Studies at Lynn University. He is the editor (often with partners) of thirty books, including *The National Security Legacy of Harry S. Truman* (2003), *Anticipating*

Madame President (2003), *Life at the White House: A Social History of the First Family and the President's Home* (2004), and *Campaigns and Elections: Issues, Concepts, Cases* (2005). Dr. Watson is the founding editor of White House Studies, a founder of the think tank Think Act Lead, and a community activist who organizes town halls, History Day programs, and voter registration drives.

INDEX

References to images are in *italic*.

A

Acheson, Dean
on Democratic senators, 125–26
and McCarthyism, 10, 75, 112, 130–31
and Truman, 6, 112, 119, 120
on Truman's foreign policy, 118, 146,
148–49, 151, 152, 170–73, 193

Adams, John, xiii, 180

Andrews, Russell, 13

atomic bomb, 10, 88, 101, 132, 181, 189

Atomic Energy Act, 18

Atomic Energy Commission, 38, 129–30

Austin, Warren, 72

Ayers, Eben, 54, 117

B

Bailey, Josiah, 27

Barkley, Alben, xv, xix, 4, 11, 40, 58,
101–2, 120n2

Baruch, Bernard, 168, 188

BeLieu, Kenneth, xxvii

Bell, David, 13

Benson, Michael T., 118–19

Benton, William, 134

Berger, Henry, 148

Beschloss, Michael, 181

Berlin Airlift, 3, 118, 181, 182

Biddle, Francis, 158

Biden, Joseph, xxxvi

the “Big Four,” 11, 58, 59

Black, Hugo, 109, 165

Boyle, Bill, 9

Brandon, Henry, xxxix

Bretton Woods Agreement, 18

Bricker, John W., 49, 66, 75

Bridges, Styles, 73

Browder, Earl, 10

Bryce, James, 180

“the buck stops here,” xiii, 180

Bureau of the Budget, xix, xxiii, 12–13,
115, 116

Bush, George H. W., xviii, xxxii–xxxiii,
32, 41, 157, 173

Bush, George W., xviii, xxxiii–xxxv,
xxxvii, 32–33, 163–64, 175

Butler, Hugh, 38

Butler, John, 10, 135

Byrd, Harry F., 36–37, 37, 66, 145

Byrd, Robert C., xxxii

C

C-SPAN presidential poll, xvii–xix, xxii–
xxv, xxvii, xxix, xxxii, xxxiv, 124,
180

Campbell, Beth, 22

Capehart, Homer E., 66, 74, 75

Carroll, John, 57

Carter, Jimmy, xxviii–xxx, xxxii, xxxix,
103, 105, 106, 114

Castle, Michael, xxxvi

Chambers, Whittaker, 113, 128–29

Chicago Tribune, 102

Childs, Marquis, 33

China

and communism, 10, 77, 112, 136

and Nixon, xiv

and State Department allegations, 77,
161

and Truman's foreign policy, 88, 92,
151, 181–182, 194

Churchill, Winston, 61, 145, 187

CIA, 118, 181

civil rights, Truman and, xvii, xx, 7–8,

11–12, 19, 36, 37, 71, 81, 87, 95–96

Civil Rights Commission, 107, 118

Clapp, Gordon, 38

Clark, Tom, 164, 165

Clifford, Clark, 7

Clinton, Bill, xviii, xxxiv, 23, 103–4, 157,
173

Clubb, O. Edmund, 161

Cold War

containment policy and, 3–4, 9–10,
144, 145–46

domestic issues and, 84, 92

- Cold War, *continued*
 and Greek-Turkish aid, 147, 149
 Marshall Plan and, 149–50
 and Truman foreign policy, 87, 125–27, 153, 182, 183–85, 194
- Congress, US
 and bipartisanship, xviii, 73, 89, 95, 115, 125, 126, 147–48, 150–53, 156
 Carter and, xxviii–xxx, xxxii, xxxix, 103
 Clinton and, xviii, xxxiii–xxxiv, 32–33, 41
 dysfunction of, 111–12
 Ford and, xviii, xxvii, xxviii, xxxviii, 41
 George H. W. Bush and, xviii, xxxii–xxxiii, 32, 41
 George W. Bush and, xviii, xxxiv–xxxv, xxxvii, 32–33
 Johnson and, xviii, xxiv–xxvi, xxviii
 Kennedy and, xxiii–xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix
 micromanagement by, 109–10
 Nixon and, xxvi–xxvii, xxviii, 32
 Obama and, xxxv–xxxviii, 104
 Reagan and, xxx–xxxii, xxxvii, xxxviii, 32–33, 41
See also congressional sessions by year
- Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 30
- Congressional Liaison, Office of, xxii. *See also* legislative liaisons
- Connally, Tom, xxii, 11–12, 125–26, 131
- Connelly, Matthew J., xxi, 5, 55
- Constitution, US
 commander in chief clause of, 33, 79, 175, 182
 in times of crisis, 173–74
- containment policy, 3–4, 9–10, 144, 145–46
- Conway, Rose, 11
- Corwin, Edward S., 172
- D
- Darman, Richard, xxxii
- Davis, Elmer, 85
- Dawson, Donald, 108
- Defense, US Department of, 118, 181, 188, 190, 194
- Democratic National Committee, 9, 11
- Deschler, Lew, 17
- Dewey, Thomas E., 7–8, 33, 185, 186, 188
- Dies, Martin, 158
- Dieterich, William, 4
- Dirksen, Everett, 135
- “Do-Nothing” Congress. *See* 80th Congress (1947–49)
- domestic policy agenda, Truman’s, 85–86, 87, 91, 98–99. *See also* Fair Deal
- Douglas, Helen Gahagan, 135
- Douglas, Paul, 134
- Douglas, William O., 159
- Downey, Sheridan, 135
- Dreyer, Philip, 9
- Drury, Allen, xix
- E
- Early, Steve, 4, 90, 100n4
- Eastland, James, 133
- Eaton, Charles, 147–48
- Ecton, Zales N., 66
- Edgerton, Harry, 163
- 80th Congress (1947–49)
 as “Do-Nothing” Congress, 6, 111, 148–49, 182
 Fair Deal and, 5–8
 House votes in, 24, 42n11, 46–47
 1948 presidential election and, 6, 19, 182
 and Roosevelt legacy, xix–xx, 95–96
 Senate votes in, 24, 48–49
 support for Truman in, 16, 26–28, 33–35, 34, 36, 39, 42n14
 and term limits, 64–65
 Truman on, 67
 Truman position votes in, 24–26, 28, 31, 32
 Truman strategy during, 40–42
 Truman’s success during, 21–23, 28–31, 35–40, 37, 39
 Truman vetoes during, 29–31, 41, 62–63, 62
- 81st Congress (1949–51), xx, 8, 19, 22, 66–67, 96–97, 113, 132
- 82nd Congress (1951–53), xx, 19, 22, 97–98
- Eisenhower, Dwight, 61, 99, 108, 186
 in C-SPAN poll, xxii, 24
 and Congress, xviii, xxv, xxi–xxii, xxxviii, 32, 41, 91, 116, 175
 election of, 173
 judicial appointments by, 104
 vetoes by, 105, 106, 114
- elections. *See* by year
- Ellender, Allen, 8
- Elsy, George, 5, 7, 8, 22, 24, 78, 79, 80
- Emanuel, Rahm, xxxv, xxxvi
- Employment Act of 1946, xx

Enarson, Harold, 13
 European Recovery Program. *See* Marshall Plan
 Executive Reorganization Act of 1939, xix, 90

F

Fair Deal, Truman's
 congressional opposition to, 10, 19, 81, 87–88, 103, 115
 80th Congress and, 5–8
 81st Congress and, 67, 96–97
 82nd Congress and, 97–98
 Fair Employment Practices Committee, 5, 94
 FBI, 9, 112, 128, 136, 157, 158–59, 163
 Feeney, Joseph, xxi, xxii, 4–5, 56, 57, 74–75
 filibusters, xxxvii, xxxviii, 40, 93, 135
 Fink, Gary M., 27
 Ford, Gerald, xvii, xviii, xxvii, xxviii, xxxviii, 41, *105, 106, 114, 124*
 Forrestal, James, 182, 183–86, 188, 194, 196, 195n14
 Frankfurter, Felix, 109, 160, 165
 Fuchs, Klaus, 130
 Fulbright, William, 33, 102
 Fulbright Scholars Program, 18

G

Gallup polls, xxxvi, 102, 129
 George, Walter, 126
 Gillon, Steve, xxxiii
 Gingrich, Newt, xxxiii–xxxiv
 Gouzenko, Igor, 128
 Grassley, Charles, xxxvii
 Great Depression, 16, 18, 86, 99, 108, 111
 Greece and Turkey, U.S. aid to, xv–xvi, 28, 38, 125, 127–28, 144, 146–49, 153, 156. *See also* Truman Doctrine
 Green, Theodore Francis, 40, 66, 131

H

Hamby, Alonzo, 128
 Harding, Ken, 11
 Harding, Warren, 5
 Hardy, Benjamin, 8
 Harlow, Bryce, xxii, xxv–xxvii, xxviii
 Harriman, Averell, 9, 110, 116
 Harrison, Pat, 4
 Hastert, Dennis, xxxiv
 Hatch, Carl, 29, 40
 Hayden, Carl, 40, 66

Herter, Christian, 182
 Hickenlooper, Bourke, 129–30, 131
 Hill, Lister, 40
 Hilty, James W., 27
 Hiss, Alger, 10, 112, 128–29, 130
 Hitchcock, Gilbert M., 168–69
 Hoffmann, Clare, 128
 Hoover, Herbert, xviii, 109, 125, 126, 128, 168
 Hoover, J. Edgar, 9, 112, 128, 136, 157
 Hoover Commission, 118
 Hope, Clifford, 152
 House, Edward M., 168
 House Appropriations Committee, xxviii, 145
 House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 9–10, 112, 124, 128–30, 132, 136, 162
 Humphrey, Hubert, 134
 Hyman, Harold, 15

I

immigration, 63, 77, 113, 118, 133, 136, 155, 163–68
 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 63, 104, 113
 Immigration Service, 166–67
 Internal Security Act of 1950, 63, 77, 104, 110, 113, 124, 133, 174
 Iraq War, xvi, xxxiv, 173, 175
 isolationism, xxvii, 72, 73, 88, 103, 111, 113, 126, 148, 182
 Israel, establishment of, 118–19, 181, 184

J

Jackson, Robert, 165–66
 Jay, John, 173
 Jefferson, Thomas, xiii, 180
 Jefferson-Jackson Day, 119
 Jenner, William E., 66, 74–75, 74
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 79–80, 118, 182, 189, 191–93
 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 129–30
 Johnson, Louis, 182, 186–94
 Johnson, Lyndon B., xiii, xxv, 81, 99, *104, 105, 106, 114, 175*
 Jones, Roger W., 12, 116
 judicial appointments, 103–4, *104*

K

Kayle, Milton, 13
 Kem, James P., *48, 66*
 Kennan, George, 145, 147

Kennedy, John F., xiii, xv, xvii, xxii–xxvi, xxviii, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix, 8, 99, 105, 106, 114
 Kerr, Robert, 114, 117
 Kilgore, Harley, 102, 110, 134
 Knauff, Ellen, 157, 164–68, 174
 Knox, Frank, 89, 183
 Korean War, 88, 92, 99, 131, 161, 182
 Congress and, 68, 194
 Truman's decisions leading to, 9, 78–80, 78
 United Nations Security Council and, 80, 157, 168–75, 193

L

labor issues, 5–6, 21, 24, 29–30, 40, 41, 61, 86, 110–11, 144
 Labor-Management Relations Act. *See* Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
 Langer, William, 117, 129, 133, 134
 Lansing, Robert, 168
 Lawton, Frederick, 116
 Laxalt, Paul, xxx
 League of Nations, 143, 168
 legislative liaisons, xviii–xix, xxi–xxiii, xxix, xxx–xxxii, xxxvi, 4–5, 55, 56, 57
 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 18–19
 Lehman, Herbert, 113
 Lilienthal, David, 37–38, 40, 129–30
 Lincoln, Abraham, x, xvi–xvii, xix, 3, 15, 120, 171, 180
 Lindsey, Jake W., 60
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 126–27, 131–32, 148, 168–69, 176n44
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Sr., 125
 Loyalty Review Boards, 10, 157–63
 Lucas, Scott W., 10, 66, 130–31, 133, 135, 171

M

MacArthur, Douglas, 75, 88, 98, 172, 181–82, 192, 193, 194
 Madison, James, 101, 180
 Marcantonio, Vito, 172
 Marshall, George C., 71–72, 72, 74, 116, 146, 147, 150–51, 154, 194
 Marshall Plan
 and Congress, 77, 125, 144, 149–53, 182
 and interim aid, 60
 McGovern on, xiii–xiv
 success of, xix, 3, 72, 87, 116, 117, 118, 156

Maylon, Charles, 4–5, 57
 McCain, John, xxxvii
 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act. *See* Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
 McCarran Internal Security Act. *See* Internal Security Act of 1950
 McCarran, Patrick A., 11, 76–77, 76, 113, 132–34, 135–36
 McCarthy, Joseph, 9, 10, 38, 73, 75, 88, 112, 130–32, 135, 157
 McCarthyism, 10, 75, 112–13, 124, 130–32. *See also* McCarthy, Joseph
 McCormack, John W., 58
 McCoy, Donald R., 182
 McFarland, Ernest, 37, 58
 McFarland, Keith D., 188
 McGovern, George, xiii–xvii, 3, 13n3
 McGrath, J. Howard, 40, 66, 117, 167
 McKellar, Kenneth D., 36, 37–38, 37, 145, 169
 McMahan, Brien, 126–27, 129, 130
 McPherson, Harry, xxv
 midterm elections. *See* by year
 Minton, Sherman, 165
 Mondale, Walter, xxix–xxx
 Moore, Edward, 25
 Moore, Frank, xxix
 Moore, John Norton, 171
 Moynihan, Daniel P., xxxiii
 Mundt, Karl, xv, 129, 130, 133
 Mundt-Ferguson bill, 113
 Mundt-Nixon bill, 47, 113, 129, 134
 Murphy, Charles S., 59, 66, 121n44
 Murray, James, 113
 Myers, Francis J., 39, 66

N

National Military Establishment, 188
 National Resources Board, 181
 National Security Act of 1947, 181, 183, 184
 National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 190
 National Security Council (NSC), 118, 181, 190
 Neustadt, Richard, xxiii, 13, 22, 116
 New Deal
 and anti-New Dealism, 18, 23, 27–29, 36, 42n14, 88–89, 90, 92, 112, 128
 bureaucracy of, 108–9
 rollbacks of, 19, 21, 23
 Southern Democrats and, 26, 27–28, 90–91

and Truman, 33, 40, 85–86, 96–97, 98
New Republic, xxxiv
Newsweek, 126
 Newton, Walter, xix
New York Times, xxvii, xxxiv, 16, 30, 61,
 136, 166
 Nimitz, Chester, 11, 191
 9/11 terrorist attacks, 163–64, 167
 1944 presidential election, 89, 90
 1946 midterm elections
 and foreign policy, 144–45
 outcome of, 29, 70, 94, 95, 115, 125
 and Truman, xx, 6, 23–24, 26, 33, 41,
 86, 95, 102, 128
 1948 presidential election, xx, 3, 6–9, 19,
 21, 30–31, 33, 38, 40, 41, 91, 95,
 115, 148, 182
 1950 midterm elections, 97–98, 135
 1952 presidential election, xxi, 9, 75, 119,
 173, 181
 1958 midterm elections, xxiii
 1960 presidential election, xv, xxiii, xxiv,
 xxxiii
 1964 presidential election, xxv
 1972 presidential election, xv
 1976 presidential election, xxviii–xxix
 1992 presidential election, xxxiii, 23
 1994 midterm elections, xxxiii
 94th Congress (1975–77), 41
 Nixon, Richard, xiv, xviii, xxvi–xxviii,
 9, 32, 104, 105, 106, 114, 128–30,
 133, 135
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), xvii, 3, 72, 88, 118,
 143–44, 173

O
 O'Brien, Lawrence, xxv–xxvii
 O'Daniel, W. Lee, 36, 38
 O'Mahoney, Joseph C., 39, 66
 O'Neill, Tip, xxxi
 Obama, Barack, xxxv–xxxviii, 104
 Obey, David, xxxiv–xxxv
 Organization of American States (OAS),
 143–44, 147

P
 Palestine, 118, 183, 184
 Pelosi, Nancy, xxxvii
 Pendergast, Tom, 4, 102–3, 108, 112, 132
 Pepper, Claude, 39, 40, 126, 132, 145, 149
 Persons, Wilton (Jerry), xxi–xxii
 Phillips, Cabell, 102

Point Four program, 3, 8
 Porter, Paul, 6
 Potsdam Conference (1945), 5, 169, 170
 presidential vetoes, xxviii, xxxiv, 104, 105,
 106, 114
 Price Administration (OPA), Office of, 5,
 6, 111
 public opinion polls, xxxiv, 102, 129

R

Rayburn, Sam, xxii, 17, 40, 46, 47, 57, 58,
 70–71, 117, 135
 Reagan, Ronald, xvii–xviii, xxx–xxxii,
 xxxvii, xxxix, 32–33, 41, 103, 124,
 128
 Reedy, George, 132
 Reid, Harry, xxxiv, xxxvii
 Republican National Committee, 144
 Robby, Joe, xv
 Robinson, Joseph, 4
 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 97
 Roosevelt, Franklin
 in C-SPAN poll, xix, xxv, 180
 and civil rights, 26
 and Congress, xix, xxv, 64, 86–89,
 90–93, 101, 143, 145
 court-packing plan of, xix, 18, 27, 40,
 87, 92
 death of, 33, 95, 102, 115
 and Dies Committee, 158
 and Truman, xviii, xxii, 60, 85–86, 89,
 100n2
 vetoes by, 104, 105, 106, 114
 See also New Deal
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 180
 Rosenman, Samuel I., 5, 94
 Ross, Charles, 9
 Rowe, James, 24, 29
 Russia. *See* Soviet Union

S
 Salmond, John A., 38
 Schilliro, Phil, xxxv–xxxvi
 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., xxiv
 Schmidt, Steve, xxxvii
 Schwellenbach, Lewis B., 109
 Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of,
 181, 182, 190, 194. *See also* Defense,
 U.S. Department of
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, xx,
 11–12, 72, 117, 125–26, 131, 143
 Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
 (SSISS), 35–36, 77

Senate Judiciary Committee, 11, 77, 109
 74th Congress (1935–37), 42n14, 92
 75th Congress (1937–39), 22–23, 27, 28,
 36, 37, 39, 42n14
 76th Congress (1939–41), 22–23, 27, 28,
 36, 37, 39, 42n14
 79th Congress (1945–47), xix–xx, 18, 23,
 94, 113
 Sheppard, Harry, 11
 Short, Joseph H., 22
 Smathers, George, xxv, 132
 Smith, H. Alexander, 126–27, 148
 Smith, Harold, 12
 Snyder, John W., 109
 Social Security, xxxv, 8–9, 21, 24, 29, 30,
 81, 87, 96
 Soviet Union
 and climate of fear, 10, 112, 128–29,
 181, 183–84, 185
 containment and, 72, 145–46, 151–52
 See also Cold War
 Spargo, Mary, 129
 Sparkman, John, 12, 39, 40, 117
 Specter, Arlen, xxxvi
 Spingarn, Stephen J., 59, 119
 Staats, Elmer, 12, 116
 Stalin, Joseph, 3–4, 132, 190
 State of the Union address, xx, xxvi, 5, 8,
 60
 State Department, US, 8, 77, 79, 113, 125,
 130–31, 146–47, 161
 Steele, John, 134
 Steelman, John R., 109
 Stevenson, Adlai, 99
 Stimson, Henry L., 89, 187
 Stowe, David, 13
 Supreme Court, US, xix, xxxii, 16, 18, 87,
 92, 109, 160, 163, 165, 166–67

T

Taber, John, 145
 Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act of
 1949, 8–9, 13n17, 115
 Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 21, 24, 40, 41
 congressional support for, 29–30, 113,
 149
 House position votes, 46
 Senate position votes, 48
 Truman veto of, 31, 62, 63, 87, 95, 96,
 104
 Taft, Robert A., 8, 9, 19, 74–75, 74, 80,
 115, 147, 172
 Tannenwald, Theodore, 110

Taylor, Glen, 25, 37, 145
 term limits, 64–65
 Thomas, Elmer, 152
 Thomas, J. Parnell, 128
 Thurmond, Strom, 38, 118
Time magazine, 132, 134, 186, 188
 Timmons, William, xxvii
 Tobey, Charles W., 66
 Treaty of Versailles, 125, 143, 168, 169
 Truman, Bess, 6, 17–18, 53, 54, 75, 95,
 180
 Truman, Harry S., 54, 56, 60, 72, 73, 76
 approval ratings, xiii–xiv, 98, 102
 assessment of, 101–3, 118–20
 and conflict with Congress, 107–14
 on Congress, 53, 54, 68–69
 and constitutional issues, 156–74
 diary of, 8, 61, 67
 humor and resiliency of, 6
 judicial appointments by, 103, 104
 memoirs of, xxi, 16, 75, 80, 143,
 147–48, 162–63
 in the Senate, xxxviii, 16–17, 27, 41,
 42n14, 61, 76, 89–90
 strategy of, 115–17
 vetoes by, 29–31, 41, 62–63, 62, 87, 95,
 96, 104–7, 105, 106, 114, 117
 as vice president, 17, 27, 40, 61, 63
 Truman, Margaret, 95, 135
 Truman Committee, xx, 17
 Truman Doctrine
 Congress and, 87, 124–28, 147–50,
 156, 182
 McGovern on, xv–xvi
 significance of, 3, 181
 success of, 72, 77, 118
 Turnip Day Session, 8, 21, 29, 60–61
 Twain, Mark, 42, 53
 2004 presidential election, xxxv
 2006 midterm elections, xxxiv, xxxv
 “two presidencies” thesis, 22, 24, 28
 Tydings, Millard, 10, 131, 135

U

United Nations
 and communism, 77
 creation of, 118, 143, 147, 169–70
 and Greek-Turkish aid, 148–50
 Korean War and, 80, 168–75, 193
 United Nations Charter, 18, 61, 157,
 169–70, 171–73, 175
 United Nations Participation Act of 1945,
 80, 170, 171–73, 175

United Nations Security Council, 79, 80,
157, 168–70, 172, 173

V

Vandenberg, Arthur, 16, 61, 102
and bipartisanship, 73, 89, 115, 126
and Greek-Turkish aid, xv–xvi, 127–28,
146, 148–49
and Marshall Plan, 150–52
and Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, xx, 72, 117
Vandenberg, Hoyt, 189
van Devender, Charles, 9
vetoes. *See* presidential vetoes
Vietnam War, xvi, xxv–xxvi, xxvii, 175
Vinson, Carl, 127–28, 191
Vinson, Fred, 109
Voorhis, Jerry, 9

W

Waggoner, Joe, xxiii
Wagner, Robert F., 8–9, 66, 115
Wallace, Bess. *See* Truman, Bess

Wallace, Henry A., 3, 13n3, 30, 95, 145, 183
Walter, Francis, 113, 166
Warren, Earl, 7, 117
Washington, George, xiii, xiv, xviii, xix,
16, 180
Washington Post, xxxv, 33, 129, 136
Watergate, xxvii
Watson, Richard A., 104, 105
Webb, James, 12–13, 115–16
Weinstein, Allen, 132
Wherry, Kenneth S., 66, 73, 79
White, William S., xxii
Wildavsky, Aaron, 22
Williams, John J., 66
Wilson, Woodrow, 125–26, 143, 168–69
World War II
domestic issues after, 23, 86, 88, 94,
144, 150
foreign policy and, 38, 98, 118, 126,
143, 156, 157–58, 174
See also Marshall Plan; Truman
Doctrine